. A previous version of this paper circulated as Friebel and Raith (1999) . We would like to thank Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont, Canice Prendergast and Gérard Roland for their encouragement and advice. The comments and suggestions of the editor and the referees substantially helped to improve the paper. We also benefited 
between the subordinate and top management is disrupted, this information is less likely to be available. While valuable information may be lost, subordinates will also be less threatening to their manager, reducing the manager's incentive to deliberately hire or develop unproductive employees.
The above argument is incomplete, however, because hiring unproductive subordinates reduces the performance of the manager's unit, which in turn reflects badly on the manager's ability. A manager who systematically hires unqualified people is unlikely to stay in his job for long. Since pressure to maximize the performance of his unit reduces a manager's incentive to abuse his authority, one could expect that the organization has no or less reason to restrict communication between his subordinates and top management. Our analysis shows that restricting communication can be optimal even when unit performance can be observed.
In the model there is a three-tier hierarchy consisting of a principal, a manager and a worker (Section 3). We assume that the principal appoints the manager and delegates to him the recruiting, training and development of the worker. The manager thus has the power to influence the productivity of the worker.
In large firms, explicit pay for performance is common among top executives but rare among the middle or lower ranks. Talented employees are typically rewarded by promotion to a higher-level job (see Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988) . Accordingly, we assume that the principal maximizes the net profit of the firm, while the manager and worker receive fixed wages. The principal initially does not know the abilities of the manager or the worker, but obtains information about them in the course of production, which may lead to job reassignments.
The principal obtains information in two ways. First, she can observe the outcome of In Section 5, we present the predictions of our theory. Firms are more likely to restrict skip-level communication and thus give managers control over information flows (i) the more difficult it is to monitor managers' personnel decisions, and hence the more a firm needs to rely on managers in making personnel decisions; (ii) the more wages in an internal labor market are backloaded and shielded from the external labor market; and (iii) the more costly it is for managers to hire good subordinates. These results show that there are important complementarities between a firm's human resource policies, its production technology, and its rules of communicating. 
Hierarchical Communication in Organizations
The central claim of our paper is that there is a link between the potential abuse of managerial authority and the prevalence of hierarchical communication in organizations.
This section presents evidence in support of this claim.
While the popular business press tends to advocate unrestricted communication as a way to achieve a maximum flow of ideas and information, most firms in practice maintain hierarchical communication patterns. That is, communication is typically confined to direct interaction between superiors and subordinates.
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This kind of hierarchical communication to some extent simply reflects the hierarchical structure of command and control, and even absent any organizational rules, one could expect most communication to follow the structure of the hierarchy. What is striking, however, is that many organizations have rules and norms that specifically discourage skip-level communication (cf. Wilson 1992 , Gilsdorf 1994 . It is the rationale for such rules that our theory seeks to explain. Lillico (1972, p.45) , for example, writes:
"Open-door policies, suggestion schemes, etc., can themselves be interpreted as bypassing methods commonly used by top management, ... These policies often generate suspicion among the bypassed middle management. How far can a subordinate go in pointing out his boss's mistakes -the man often in 2 Perhaps as a consequence, almost all research on the determinants of upward communication focuses on direct supervisor-subordinate communication. Mention of skip-level communication is almost completely absent from this literature, cf. Wilson (1992) . The only work we know of that looks at skip-level communication, that of Randolph and Finch (1977) and Wilson (1992) , does not address to what extent the organizations studied encourage or discourage skip-level communication.
charge of his progress and salary in the organization?" Similarly, Baird (1977, p.267) The quotes indicate that fear of managers' obstructive behavior rather than concerns for optimal information processing is what leads firms to restrict communication between employees and higher-level superiors.
The experience with "360 degree feedback" and "upward appraisals" provides further evidence in support of our theory. In the late 1980's, many management theorists recommended involving subordinates in the evaluation of managers' performance. Firms have been reluctant, however, to implement upward appraisals. In a survey of 305 firms (Bettenhausen and Fedor 1997) , only 9% reported to use upward appraisals. The dangers associated with upward appraisals are evident: "A potentially negative aspect of an employee rating a supervisor is the possibility of retaliation. Supervisors who are aware that subordinates have given them negative ratings may punish them by assigning undesirable tasks, withholding salary increases, or generally making the employees' jobs more difficult.
3 The same argument is also made in the non-academic management literature, see for example Falconi (1997) : "[the] most important [problem with open-door policies is that]-encouraging employees to avoid using the chain of command is demoralizing to supervisors. Sure, actually talking to the CEO or some other member of senior management may make the employee low down on the ladder feel good, but how does the supervisor of that employee feel? Isn't he an employee too?" Similar comments pointing out "demoralizing" effects on middle managers who are bypassed are common. Most, however, do not pin down exactly what the resulting problems for the organization (not just the managers) are. (Brutus, Fleenor, London 1998) .
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Hence, it is today widely believed that upward appraisals should be used only for purposes of feedback and development of the superiors' skills rather than as a basis for their pay, promotion, or termination (Dalton 1998) . There is a consensus that upward appraisals work best if an organization is characterized by a flat hierarchy, participatory management, and a good corporate climate. If the scope for conflict between managers and their subordinates is large, then upward appraisals, which represent a form of institutionalized violation of the chain-of-command principle, should be avoided -in line with our theory.
The Model
We consider an organization that consists of three individuals in a hierarchical relationship: a principal ("P", female), a manager ("M", male), and a worker ("W", female).
Timing
There are two periods, 1 (stages 1 through 5 of the game) and 2 (stages 6 through 8). In each period, P and M make personnel decisions, which are followed by the production of output, and in period 1 by a stage in which W may communicate with P.
P hires M.
With probability α 0 , M is productive ("good"), and with probability 1 − α 0 , he is unproductive ("bad"). The type "good" or "bad" refers to the quality of the match between person and job, and is is unknown to M before he is hired. As soon as M starts his job, he learns his type.
M chooses α ∈ [0, 1] (while recruiting or training W), which affects W's productivity:
with probability α, W is good, and with probability 1 − α she is bad. See Section 3.2 below for details.
4 A practitioner, Kiechel (1989) writes: "Even fans of the practice admit that it's tricky. Do not try it, for instance, in an authoritarian organization, one being downsized, or any place with minimal communication up and down: it will only feed the general paranoia. Administered incorrectly, the process may leave subordinates open to reprisals from you know whom."
4. M and W jointly produce the first-period output y, which can be observed by P, but is not contractible. The production technology is described in Section 3.3. 
W signals productivities to P(see

M retains or replaces W.
We assume that this not a strategic decision: a retained M, who knows W's type, acts in the firm's interest and retains W if she is good and hires a new W if she is bad. Any newly hired W is good with probability α 0 , regardless of whether the M hiring her was retained, recently promoted, or just hired.
8. The second-period output is realized. Only P and M are players in a game-theoretic sense. Each chooses one action in the course of the game, M at stage 2, when he hires W, and P at stage 6, when she decides whether to retain M. All other moves in the game are dominant actions.
Recruitment and Personnel Development
When M chooses the probability α of having a good W, he incurs the following cost:
(1)
5 Alternatively, we could assume that a person who is good as a W is also good as an M with some probability β ≤ 1. None of our results change under this weaker assumption, except that we need to specify a lower bound to β.
The first term represents the cost of M's productive effort to increase W's expected productivity. This cost is scaled by k 0 and is convex in M's desired probability of hiring a good W. The second term represents the costs of influence effort that M may want to exert. We assume that P monitors M's personnel decisions to an extent measured by k 1 .
The costs of influence effort are convex in 1 − α (the probability of having a bad W), because it is easy for M to get P's approval for a candidate with outstanding credentials, but difficult to get P's approval of an applicant that looks rather weak.
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For future reference, denote the optimal probabilities chosen by a good and a bad M as α g and α b . We assume that
to exclude a situation that does not make sense economically. Recall that a 0 is the probability with which P hires a good M. As we will show in Proposition 1, α 0 b represents the highest level of α b in any possible equilibrium of the game. Without assumption (2), the worker hired by M might be good (and therefore also good as an M) with a higher probability (from P's perspective) than M himself, in which case P might like to promote W and replace M even without any communication from W to P. Assumption (2) is necessary though not sufficient to rule out this situation.
Joint Production by M and W
The output y produced by M and W is random and takes the values 0 or 1. We disregard any moral-hazard problems related to production; the probability of y = 1 only depends on the productivities of M and W. Let q gg = Prob{y = 1| M=good and W=good}, and define q gb , q bg and q bb analogously. Thus, the firm's technology is completely characterized by the vector q = (q gg , q gb , q bg , q bb ).
We assume that q gg ≥ q gb ≥ q bg ≥ q bb . The first and the last inequalities state that the expected output is an increasing function of the productivities of M and W. The second inequality states that M is at least as important for production as W. We also assume that q gg − q gb ≥ q bg − q bb , which means that a good manager values having a good rather than a bad worker more highly than does a bad manager. In other words, M's and W's productivities are complementary.
3.4 Structure of the Signal from W to P In formal terms, P receives a signal z that takes the value 'd' (types are disclosed) if W successfully signals to her that W is good and M bad. If either the production team is of another form, or if W's signal does not get through to P, the signal z takes the value 'c' (types are concealed). It is always optimal for W to send a signal if she is better than M because she can never lose, but possibly gain by being promoted. This signal structure can be seen as resulting from the following more primitive assumptions:
1. The signal from W to P is not contractible. That is, the evidence W produces cannot be used in court, and can therefore not be the basis of an explicit contract. 4. W sends a signal to P if and only if her expected benefit from doing so is positive.
Moreover, to keep the model tractable, we assume that only W, not M, can communicate productivities to P. To illustrate these assumptions, suppose M's and W's joint project involves the purchase of securities. If W suggested the purchase of one type, but M decided to purchase another type, and it turns out that W's investment would have been more profitable, W can ex post convince P of this, by producing memos or other internal documents as evidence. Such evidence conveys information only about the relative, not the absolute abilities of M and W. It is also unrealistic to assume that P and W can write a contract that compensates W for proving that her suggested investment was better than M's.
Payoffs
Our assumptions about the players' payoffs are based on Baker, Jensen and Murphy's (1988) empirical observations that "explicit financial rewards in the form of transitory performance-based bonuses seldom account for an important part of a worker's compensation", and that "most of the average increases in an employee's compensation can be traced to promotions and not to continued service in a particular position ... Promotions are used as the primary incentive tools in most organizations." An implication of this observation is that reaching a higher level in a hierarchy is associated with a rent or quasi-rent.
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Motivated by these stylized facts, we assume that the base wages M and W receive in each period are fixed and exogenous, and are given by r M > r W > 0. Since it is impossible to write contracts that specify payments to M or W contingent on realizations of y or z, the wages r M and r W represent the two agents' total compensation in each period. If M is fired after the first period, he receives a wage of less than r M in a different job; that is, he loses a rent. For simplicity, let M's wage in an alternative job be r W .
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Our assumptions imply that M strictly prefers keeping his job to losing it; and W strictly prefers promotion over staying in her job. The manager chooses α to maximize his discounted second-period payoff, net of his recruiting costs
where P ret (α) is the probability that M is retained, as a function of α and his own type; and δ is the discount factor.
The principal maximizes the firm's profit, i.e. the expected present value of outputs produced in the two periods, net of the monetary compensation for M and W. In addition, 7 Theories that predict backloaded age-wage profiles include Salop and Salop (1976) and Lazear (1981) . To the extent that pay increases are administered through promotions, backloaded wages imply that pay is correlated with the rank in a hierarchy. Theories that directly predict wages that increase in rank include Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Qian (1994) . 8 We also rule out that the (M,W)-unit of the firm is sold to M, i.e. that M becomes the residual claimant of this unit.
we allow in our model that there are positive effects of open communication unrelated to the detection of bad Ms, captured by the assumption that the firm's expected profit increases in φ at rate ω ≥ 0.
Formally, P's beliefs about the composition of the (M,W)-team are characterized by a probability distribution over the four possible teams (g,g), (g,b) , (b,g), and (b,b) . Let (the quadruple) p 1 denote P's beliefs about the team in the first period, and let E(p 2 ) be her expected beliefs in period 2. Since p 2 is the P's belief at the beginning of period 2, we take the expected value in looking at the ex-ante expected profit. Normalizing the payoff associated with y = 1 to 1, the firm's expected profit can be written as
We allow δ to exceed 1, since the second period might represent a discounted future that may be more important than the first period.
Equilibrium and Optimal Openness of Communication
First, we derive the equilibrium for the game between P and M. We then analyze how an organizational planner would optimally choose the level of openness φ, and finally discuss the robustness of our results when monetary incentives are feasible.
Equilibrium
In its reduced form, the model is a simple sequential game involving M and P with incomplete information on part of P. There are two types of Ms, good ones and bad ones.
P knows the distribution of types (given by α 0 ) but cannot observe the type of M she hires. M chooses an unobservable probability that W is good, depending on his own type.
Upon observing the team's output and W's message to P, P chooses to retain M, hire a new one, or promote W.
Proposition 1 If
there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It has the following properties: (i) a good M chooses
(ii) a bad M chooses
and ( More precisely, a low output (y = 0) is negative information about M, but observing z = c is favorable news. Condition (5) ensures that the first effect dominates: if q gg = 1, then upon observing y = 0, P knows that M and W cannot both be good, and in this case it is more likely that M is bad than that B is bad. Thus, low output is sufficiently bad news about M to outweigh the positive effect of z = c on P's updated belief, inducing P to hire a new M. Conditions(5) and (6), in conjunction with (2), also ensure that P would never want to promote W if z = c.
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M's best response is to choose the α that maximizes his payoff (3), anticipating P's response to y and z. Since a good M (for whom always z = c) is retained if and only if y = 1, the probability of being retained for him is P ret (α) = αq gg +(1−α)q gb . Substituting this expression into (3) leads to the expression for α g stated in the proposition. A bad M, in contrast, is fired whenever y = 0, but also if z = d, which happens with probability φ if W is good. Hence, the probability of being retained for him is P ret (α) = α(1 − φ)q bg +
(1 − α)q bb , which leads to the expression for α b in Proposition 1.
Comparing α g and α b , we find that for any φ, a bad M chooses a lower probability than a good M, for two reasons: 1. Because of our complementarity assumption, a good Notice also that when φ ≥ 1 − q bb /q bg , M actively engages in abusive behavior in the sense of choosing an α below the level that minimizes C(α). Here, M's risk of being exposed by a better W is so large that M prefers to incur the cost of getting P's approval in trying to hire a bad W. If, in contrast, P does not control M's personnel decisions at
Other equilibria: If conditions (5) or (6) do not hold, the resulting equilibrium is still unique for any set of of parameters. We can distinguish two types of equilibria: first, there is an equilibrium in which P always retains M, irrespective of output, as long as z = c. A bad M would then have no incentive to hire a good W, since a good W only threatens M's position. It follows that when the performance of M's unit is not sufficiently informative of M's productivity, the problem of strategic recruiting is most severe. Throughout the 9 Notice that (2) together with (8) implies that α 0 ≥ α b , whereas (6) is somewhat stronger than the complementarity assumption q gg − q gb >bg − q bb imposed earlier.
paper, we assume that output is sufficiently informative to influence P's decision not because the opposite case is unrealistic, but to make clear that restricting communication may be desirable even if performance is observable.
Second, there are equilibria in which P promotes W upon observing y = 0 or y = 1, although z = c (Condition (2) is not sufficient to rule them out). We have argued that such equilibria are economically unrealistic, for they imply that P would in effect prefer to delegate hiring of the second-period M to the first-period M, instead of hiring M herself. To see this, notice that φ affects the expected profit both directly (the first and third effects discussed above), and indirectly through α b :
Optimal Choice of φ
Since expected profit is linear in φ, and α b is a linear function of φ, the second-order derivative simplifies to d 
Monetary Incentives
We have seen above that if P can observe an output signal that is informative of M's productivity, a bad M's incentive to abuse his authority is alleviated, although generally not eliminated. It is natural to ask whether an output signal is even more useful if M's compensation can be conditioned on it. We therefore now assume that the output y is contractible, while continuing to take the base wages r M and r w as given. Two types of contingent payments are conceivable: a bonus that is paid whenever performance is good, and a severance payment that is made if performance is good but M is fired nevertheless.
Severance payments:
The principal can offer a contract stipulating a severance payment s that is paid only if M is fired and y = 1. Such a contract insures a bad M against losing his job because of communication between W and P, and should reduce the risk of abuse of authority.
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How does the feasibility of severance payments affect the firm's optimal communication structure compared to our preceding analysis?
If a bad M receives s if he is fired when y = 1, then his payoff changes from (3) to
where P ret is unchanged (cf. Proposition 1). The resulting optimal effort α b is
Thus, α b is increasing in s for any φ and any s > 0. With a severance payment, a bad M has less to lose if he is revealed by a good W and is subsequently fired. This increases M's incentive to exert effort.
Offering severance pay has two effects for P: expected profit increases in s through its effect on α b . This effect is proportional to r M − r W , i.e. the loss to M if he is fired. On the other hand, s is a direct cost that must be paid with probability (1 − α 0 )α b φq bg , i.e. the probability that M is bad, W is good, z = d and y = 1. A variety of cases can occur:
(i) By offering s = δ(r M − r W ), P can completely eliminate abusive behavior of M.
Then, α b has the same value that it would have if φ = 0, and does not depend on φ.
10 Three remarks: First, abusive behavior may only arise because a bad M risks to lose his job although y = 1 -if z = d, which is possible only if W is good. Second, an alternative setup is to assume that output cannot be verified, but that severance payments can be specified for the case that M is fired and W subsequently promoted (since without W's signal, P would never have an incentive to promote W).
The results obtained under this rather unrealistic assumption differ only slightly from those presented here. Third, notice that P would never want to pay severance regardless of output, as this would only reward bad performance and reduce the incentives for both a good and a bad M to hire a good W. Bonus payments: Suppose P offers M a bonus b for high output in order to increase his incentive to choose a good W. In our two-period model, such a bonus is very similar to a raise of r M in the second period, since M is also retained only if y = 1. (Such a raise could be seniority-based, i.e. be offered only to a retained M, even under the noncontractibility assumptions of Section 4.) The only difference between b and ∆ r is that if z = d and y = 1, a bad M would receive the bonus but not the raise. This means that a bonus is equivalent to a severance payment combined with a raise of the same discounted magnitude. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4 Let π(s, b, ∆ r ) denote the firm's expected profit as a function of a severance payment s, a bonus b and a raise ∆ r for a retained M. Then δ(dπ/db) = dπ/d∆ r + δ(dπ/ds).
Proposition 4 implies that when a severance payment is feasible and raising the manager's compensation is not desired, a severance payment is a better targeted instrument than a bonus payment. On the other hand, when raising the manager's compensation is desired, a suitable bonus can be superior to a raise because it implicitly includes a severance payment and hence provides better incentives for the manager's personnel decisions. 
Part(i):
More control by P over M's personnel decisions raises the costs of abusive behavior and leads to higher levels of α b for any φ. A higher φ is then optimal. The more costly it is to monitor supervisors' personnel decisions, the greater the extent to which personnel decisions must be delegated to managers (cf. also the discussion in Section 6.1 below). Often, the extent of managerial involvement in personnel decisions can be measured rather precisely (see for example Pinfield 1995, pp. 316-320). Moreover, it is also likely to be correlated with measures of task uncertainty and the degree of job formalization, which have also been used in the literature, cf. Wilson (1992) .
Part (ii):
The difference r M −r W affects the optimal φ through α b . If r M −r W decreases, α b decreases in φ at a smaller rate. Trading off the benefits of openness and the loss due to abuse of authority, P therefore chooses a larger φ. Employees (except for those at the lowest levels) earn rents if a firm's wages are backloaded either for incentive (Lazear 1981) or selection (Salop and Salop 1976) reasons. Internal labor markets with this feature are characterized by wages that do not vary sensitively with wages on the external labor market. Moreover, employees must expect to spend some time in the firm, and to have the opportunity to get promoted into better-paid positions. Consequently, restrictions on communication are more likely to be observed (i) the less closely wages are related to the external market (see Bertrand 1998 , who measures this relationship directly), (ii) the longer employees' job tenures are, and (iii) the more a firm fills vacancies by promoting employees from within. Part (iv): a larger α 0 is tantamount to a lower probability of recruiting a bad M.
There are two effects: first, given α b , P is now less concerned about M's potential abuse of authority, which would suggest to increase φ. On the other hand, if the probability of having a bad M decreases, P's benefit from detecting a bad M decreases too, which would suggest to decrease φ. If ω = 0, i.e. without any other benefit of openness for the firm, this second effect outweighs the first, implying that an increase in α 0 leads to a decrease in the optimal φ. If, however, ω exceeds some minimal level, then the effect is reversed: a higher probability of recruiting a good M implies that the firm can now 11 A corollary of this prediction is that a firm's transition from a shielded internal labor market with backloaded wages to more market-based wages (for evidence of this trend, see Bertrand 1998) The effects of changes in the δ on the optimal φ are ambiguous, since we have assumed that the discount factors are the same for both P and M.
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For example, an increase in the firm's discount factor makes detecting a bad M more important for the firm, which suggests an increase in φ. On the other hand, an increase in M's discount factor raises the value to M of keeping his job. While α g would increase, α b might decrease, and it may be optimal to reduce φ.
Similarly, the effects of changes in q on the optimal φ are ambiguous. The obvious conjecture, for instance, would be that the more informative observed output is (reflected in some measure of the spread of the q ij ), the more a bad M benefits from having a good W, hence the greater α b , and hence the greater the degree of openness φ that the firm can afford. More generally, there is an "output effect" of the model parameters on the optimal φ: since restricting φ only serves to induce a bad M to hire a good W, changes that induce an increase in α b lead the firm to increase φ. There is a second, "detection" effect, however, that goes in the opposite direction. If future profits are important, then conditional on having a bad M, the firm may not want a bad M to hire a good W, because then a bad M stands to remain in the firm with greater probability, which reduces expected future profits. The optimal value of φ depends on the relative importance of the output and detection effects, which in turn depends on δ.
Alternative Solutions and Implementation
The formal analysis leaves open how restricted communication compares to alternative policies, and to what extent the organization can implement the desired openness. We turn to these issues in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Alternative Solutions
The abuse of personnel authority is recognized as a problem both among practitioners and in the more applied management literature. South and Matejka (1990) , for example, observe that "Weak performing managers avoid selecting individuals who will threaten their status and contrast their own substandard performance. Surprisingly, they seem able to do this rather well". The academic literature, in contrast, appears not to have addressed this problem in any systematic way. 
Centralization of personnel decisions:
In response to the tendency of managers to make personnel decisions that serve their own rather than the firm's interests, firms may try to shift such decisions to a centralized personnel department.
14 Indeed, the emergence of internal labor markets in American corporations in the mid-20th century, in part a result of pressure by unions that distrusted managers, was characterized by a shift toward more formalized and centralized personnel decisions (Jacoby 1984) . But hierarchies exist precisely because it is efficient to delegate tasks, including personnel decisions, to managers;
and there are limits to monitoring managers in what they do. In practice, "most line managers make the final employment or promotion decision" (South and Matejka 1990) 13 We are not alone with this impression. Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) , too, note that "Although much theoretical and empirical research has examined organizational power, virtually none has addressed the hierarchical abuse of power in organizations." An exception is the occasional mention in the literature that managers often prefer subordinates who are similar to themselves, or who are "yes men". 14 Shifting authority away from managers is, for the purposes of this paper, largely equivalent to monitoring managers' decisions more closely. In our model, this would be reflected in an increase in k 1 , cf. Proposition 5.
because their assessment of future subordinates is essential.
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Even if hiring decisions are made by a personnel department, managers still retain substantial influence over their subordinates' careers and may use it to their advantage as long as subordinates pose a threat to them (cf. footnote 4).
Employment guarantee: Another way to prevent the abuse of authority is to guarantee not to fire a manager regardless of bad news about him. Carmichael (1988) argues that tenure in academia protects senior faculty against being replaced by more productive assistant professors. This assures the incentive to recruit the most productive juniors. While lifetime employment may or may not be optimal in academia, employment guarantees are rarely offered in firms that have to survive in a competitive environment. If it is impossible to prevent university boards from comparing the performance of senior and junior faculty members (since the performance is largely public anyway), then the institution of tenure may be the only feasible, if costly, solution.
Non-replacement rules: Many organizations follow a policy of never promoting an employee to the position of her immediate superior. If W cannot hope to get M's position as a direct consequence of communicating with P, she will have much less incentive to do so, which reduces the threat of replacement for M. The protection for M might be only 15 Cf. also Pinfield 1995, p.316: "In salaried employment systems [as opposed to blue-collar employment systems], managers typically have considerable discretion as to how jobs should be defined and which employee qualities would be most suited to performance of those jobs". 16 Well-known examples are partnerships in law, auditing and consulting firms. Similarly, lifetime employment has been a central element in the organization of large Japanese corporations. In both cases, however, there is trend away from employment guarantees.
limited, though, for if W credibly informs P that M is unproductive, M will be fired even if W does not get promoted. Even if W has no specific interest in harming M, she may communicate with P to make a good impression, hoping to get promoted to a different department sometime later.
Promotion by seniority: More effective in preventing a subordinate from competing for her boss's job is to promote employees by seniority rather than performance. Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that the bureaucratic features of internal labor markets are necessary to provide experienced workers with an incentive to train younger workers: "the effectiveness of on-the-job training depends heavily upon the willingness of experienced workmen to teach new workers. Incumbent employees are thus in a position to frustrate this training process..." (p.84). Hence, "A certain degree of wage rigidity and job security is therefore necessary for on-the-job training to operate at all" (p.33).
Our discussion suggests that as remedies for the abuse of authority, hierarchical communication and promotion by seniority are substitutes. This may seem counterintuitive, as casual observation suggests that rigid internal labor markets often exhibit both. It is important, however, to distinguish between seniority-based promotions as a policy and in equilibrium: if a firm maintains a strict chain of command, managers making promotion decisions may have to choose from the employees one or two levels below them, whom they know, ignoring those at lower ranks. Thus, promotions can in equilibrium be correlated with seniority even if seniority is not an explicit criterion for promotion. In other words, At the end of the two sub-periods, each worker can give a report about each manager.
In this setup, each manager's payoff depends half on the worker he hires, and half on the worker hired by the other manager. The result is a free-riding effect that can go in either direction. A bad manager who without job rotation would actively seek to recruit a bad W by choosing α b on the downward-sloping part of C(α) would now have less of an incentive to abuse his authority. Any other manager, however, would have less of an incentive to hire a good worker. The net effect is ambiguous and depends on α 0 , the ease with which the organization can hire productive managers.
Implementation
An important issue is how hierarchical communication can be implemented in practice;
specifically, how employees can be prevented from communicating with their bosses' supe- (2000) call the "approachability" of superiors, which is shaped by both architecture and symbols.
Lockers of blue-collar workers can be close or remote to the offices of management. People at different levels in the hierarchy may work in physical proximity to each other, or the location of an office may reflect the hierarchy, with top management on the top floors and lower-level employees on lower floors.
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Management can also influence communication through open-or closed-door policies and the use of information technology.
As De Long and Fahey point out, the ability to contact higher-level managers also depends on organizational practices, such as the frequency of staff meetings, and the participation of managers of non-adjacent hierarchy levels in the same meetings.
Second, in addition to physical and institutional barriers to communication, top managers can actively discourage employees from violating the chain of command. They can build a reputation for not talking to lower-level employees and not listening to their complaints about their supervisors. The firm can encourage such behavior by fostering an organizational culture based on the chain of command and the authority of supervisors.
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Top managers may also have an individual reason to ignore or punish a subordinate whose comments about her supervisor's competence identifies her as a "troublemaker", even if the information thus obtained is useful.
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Third, openness is affected by the ability of a subordinate to provide top management with convincing evidence that she is more qualified than her superior. This factor, too, is influenced by the firm's organizational procedures and policies. We conclude that while the openness of communication cannot be fine-tuned, there are many mechanisms that organizations can use to make it harder (or easier) for some members of the organization to communicate openly with each other, and top managers themselves can influence the openness of communication to a considerable extent.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed an incentive-based explanation for hierarchical communication. Managers who fear being replaced by their subordinates have an incentive to recruit and develop weaker but less dangerous subordinates. This incentive is mitigated 18 In line with this reasoning, the Bureau of National Affairs found in a survey of formal complaint procedures within firms that managers' decisions are almost always upheld by higher levels in response to complaints (Bureau of National Affairs 1979). An alternative explanation for this finding, however, would be that higher levels refrain from "undermining the authority" of supervisors because their trustworthiness is important for the subordinates' work morale, cf. Prendergast (1994) . 19 Or as Caesar put it: "I love treason but hate a traitor" (Bartlett's 1992, p.88) . Employees who make negative remarks about their superiors are likely to face similar retaliation as do whistle-blowers, even if complaints are justified (for evidence on retaliation against whistle-blowers, see Rothschild and Miethe 1999 Our analysis suggests that the design of an intra-firm communication structure must take into account the firm's human resource practices and the employees' possible strategic behavior. As we have shown, the wage structure, the effectiveness of recruiting good line managers (which also depends on resources spent), the monitoring of personnel decisions, and job design, all affect the firm's optimal level of openness of communication.
It follows from our analysis that it is unwise to allow or even encourage communication 2. In some situations the types of M and W can be seen as stochastically independent.
Here, if e.g. Prob(M=g) = a and Prob(W=g) = b, we will use the shorthand notation 3. A good M is hired with probability α 0 , and hires a good W with probability α g .
A bad M hires a good W with probability α b . Hence, the prior for P's belief about the 
Depending on whether y = 1 or y = 0 is observed, the posterior of p is
5. Finally, we determine how P's beliefs are affected by her decision regarding M. If P promotes W and a new W is hired, her belief is
If she hires a new M, this M is good with probability α 0 . By assumption, W is retained if and only if she is good (the probability of which is p W (p)). Otherwise, a new W is hired and is good with probability α 0 . Thus, P's belief upon hiring an new M is
If P retains M, her belief is to (b,g) or from (g,b) to (g,g), respectively) with probability α 0 .
Using (10) and (12)- (15), hiring is preferred to promoting if
and hiring is preferred to retaining if
We discuss in 4. below for which parameters (16) and (17) are satisfied.
3. If z = c and y = 1, P's optimal action depends on which of t
(p 0 )))q is maximal. These payoffs have the common denomi-
hence it suffices to compare the numerators only. To simplify the resulting expressions, define ψ = q gb − q bg + α 0 (q gg − q gb ). Using (10)-(11) and (13)-(15), retaining is preferred to promoting if 
and retaining is preferred to hiring if (17) is q gg = 1. A sufficient condition for (18) and (19) is q gb + q bg < q gg , the assumption stated in the proposition: since the lefthand sides of both inequalities are linear in α g , the minimum of each expression is attained at either α g = 0 or α g = 1. If α g = 0, then (19) is satisfied, whereas if α g = 1, (18) is satisfied whenever q gb +q bg < q gg . M's best response: Given P's strategy, the probability of retention is P ret (α) = αq gg + (1 − α)q gb for a good M and P ret (α) = α(1 − φ)q bg + (1 − α)q bb for a bad M. After substituting these expressions into (3), maximization with respect to α leads to the expressions for α g and α b stated in the proposition.
Uniqueness:
Since P's best response was derived for any α g ≥ α b , the equilibrium derived is unique unless there exists an equilibrium in which α g < α b . This would require that P provides negative incentives, i.e. that she retains M if y = 0 and z = c, and fires him if y = 1.
For such an equilibrium to exist in turn requires that for some φ, both (17) and (20) be negative. We show that this can never be the case. To see this, notice that the numerator in (17) is decreasing in φ, while the numerator of (20) is increasing in φ. Specifically, (17) can be negative only if φ exceeds
However, substituting this value for φ into the Numerator of (20) (16)- (20) hold, we obtain equilibria in which P's strategy in the case z = c is as described in the following 
